Abstract-Recently, Yang and Tan proposed a certificateless key exchange protocol without pairing, and claimed their scheme satisfies forward secrecy, which means no adversary could derive an already-established session key unless the full user secret keys (including a private key and an ephemeral secret key) of both communication parties are compromised. However, in this paper, we point out their protocol is actually not secure as claimed by presenting an attack launched by an adversary who has learned the private key of one party and the ephemeral secret key of the other, but not the full user secret keys of both parties. Furthermore, to make up this flaw, we also provide an improved protocol in which the private key and the ephemeral secret key are closely intertwined with each other for generating the session key, thus above attack can be efficiently resisted.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional public key cryptography (PKC), a trust certification authority (CA) signs a digital certificate of a user, and the public key infrastructure (PKI) manages the certificate to provide the authenticity of public keys. However, certificate management, including distribution, revocation, storage and validation cost, should face many challenges in practice [1] . To resolve the problem of certificate management, identitybased public key cryptography (ID-PKC) was proposed by Shamir [2] in 1984. Its basic idea is that the users can choose arbitrary strings, such as their email addresses or other online identities, as their public keys, and the corresponding private keys are created by binding the identities with a master key of a trusted private key generator (PKG). In this case, there is no need for certification, but a new question came out. Key generation center (KGC) is needed to make the private key for every user according to his identity, which means it can get all the users' secret keys. Thus, ID-PKC has to confront so-called key escrow problem. In order to eliminate the drawbacks of both ID-PKC and PKI, a new paradigm of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was provided by Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] in 2003. The key idea of CL-PKC is that we combine a partial private key generated by the KGC with some secret value chosen by ourselves to construct the private key. Obviously, the CL-PKC is more interesting as which received both benefits of the ID-PKC and traditional PKI. Thus, CL-PKC is often considered as a cross between PKI and ID-PKC.
Key exchange (KE) protocols are mechanisms which establish a shared key by two or more parities communicating over an insecure network. However, compared with the certificateless encryption and signature [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , the study of key exchange protocol based on CL-PKC is seldom discussed. Al-Riyam and Paterson [3] proposed the first certificateless key exchange protocol which had no formal security model and proof. Later, some certificateless key exchange (CL-KE) protocols [1, 14, 15] were proposed with heuristic key security analysis. Then, Swanson [16] gave the general security analysis to the proposed certificateless key exchange protocols. However, all of certificateless key exchange protocols above are based on the bilinear pairings. Compared with the exponentiations, the computation of pairing is extremely expensive, so the certificateless key exchange protocol without pairing based on the CL-PKC was proposed by Geng and Hou [17, 18] . Unfortunately, none of these protocols is secure [19] . Recently, Yang and Tan [20] proposed a new CL-KE protocol without pairing and claimed that their scheme was strongly secure to their security model.
In this paper, we point out that Yang and Tan's protocol is actually not secure as claimed by presenting an attack launched by an adversary who has learned the private key of one party and the ephemeral secret key of the other, but not the full user secret keys of both parties. That is, the adversary can make a RevealEphemeralKey(A,i) query to learn the ephemeral secret key e A of one communication party A and make a RevealSecretValue(B) query to learn the private key S B of the corresponding party B, and successfully calculates the session key, which means that the forward secrecy is not satisfied. Furthermore, to make up this flaw, we also provide an improved protocol in which the private key and the ephemeral secret key are closely intertwined with each other for generating the session key. In other words, we add z 8 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we list the certificateless key exchange protocol and its security model. In Section 3, we review Yang and Tan's strongly secure certificateless key exchange protocol without pairing. In Section 4, we give our attacks on Yang and Tan's scheme as well as a possible improvement . We give some further security discussions in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
II. CERTIFICATELESS KEY EXCHANGE AND ITS SECURITY MODEL

A. Certificateless key exchange
A CL-KE protocol is specified by the following probabilistic polynomial time algorithms:
. This algorithm takes a security parameter k as input and returns the master secret key msk and the master public key mpk.
ExtractIdBasedKey(msk, ID).
This algorithm takes master key msk and a user's identity ID as input, and returns a partial private key D ID corresponding to the user.
SetSecretValue(mpk, ID).
This algorithm takes the master public key mpk and a user's identity ID as input, and returns secret value S ID corresponding to the user.
SetPublicKey(mpk, D ID , S ID
). This algorithm takes the master public key mpk, a user's secret values S ID as input, and returns a public key pk ID corresponding to the user.
SetPrivateKey(mpk, D ID , S ID
). This algorithm takes a master public key mpk, a user's partial private key D ID and a secret value S ID as input, and returns a full private key sk ID corresponding to the user.
B. Adversarial model
In the CL-KE protocol as defined in [1] , the adversarial model is defined via a game between an adversary A and a game simulator S. At first, S runs the setup algorithm to generate (mpk, msk) and returns mpk to A. Then A can deliver, drop, modify or inject messages for he can control all the network. Furthermore, A may ask a polynomial number of the following queries:
CreateUser (ID). By this query, the adversary A sets up a new user with identity ID. Upon receiving such a query, S generates D ID , S ID , pk ID and sk ID , returns pk ID to A.
Send(U, i, m)
. By this query, the adversary A input the message m to instance ∏ i U .
∏ i U executes protocol and returns the output message M out to A.
RevealMasterKey(U ). This query allows A to obtain the msk.
RevealIDBasedKey(U ). This query allows
RevealSecretValue(U ). This query allows A to obtain the S U .
RevealSecretKey(U ). This query allows A to learn the sk U .
RevealEphemeralKey(U, i). This query allows
A to obtain the ephemeral secret key generated by ∏ i U . 
RevealSessionKey(U, i). This query allows
A (k) = 2P r[b ′ = b] − 1.
As an instance
∏ i U uses both long-term key pair ((ID U , pk U ), sk U ) and ephemeral key pair (epk U , esk U ), once both the sk U and esk U are exposed, the adversary can trivially compute the session key ssk (1) The adversary makes a RevealSessionKey(U, i) query.
(2) The adversary makes both RevealSecretKey(U ) and RevealEphemeralKey(U, i) queries.
(3) The adversary makes RevealMasterKey query or RevealIDBasedKey(U ) query, and also makes both RevealSecretValue(U ) query and RevealEphemeralKey(U, i) queries.
(4)
∏ i U uses a public/private key pair which is different from its original key pair, and the adversary makes RevealMasterKey query or RevealIDBasedKey(U ) query, and also makes a RevealEphemeralKey(U, i) query. 
Definition1. Session Freshness
Definition2
. A CL-KE protocol is said to be secure if (1) in the presence of a benign adversary who only faithfully conveys messages, then two instances output the same session key;
(2) for any PPT adversary, Adv
Definition3. Forward Secrecy
Forward secrecy means that learning the full user secret key should not allow an adversary to derive an already-established session key.
III. REVIEW OF YANG AND TAN'S CL-KE PRTOCOL
Yang and Tan's certificateless key exchange protocol without pairing [20] consists of six algorithms: Setup, ExtractIdBasedKey, SetSecretValue, SetPublicKey, SetPrivateKey and Key Exchange. which is described as follows:
Let DS = {KG, Sig, V er} denote a digital signature scheme that is unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attack [21] .
Setup (1 k ) . KGC chooses a cyclic group G of prime order q, and picks a random number x ∈ Z q , and g ∈ G \ {1}, and computes g x = y . Then, KGC runs the key generation algorithm of DS to generate a signature/verfication key pairing (sk, vk). At last, KGC sets msk = (x, sk), mpk = (y, vk).
ExtractIdBasedKey(msk, ID) . Given an identity ID, KGC picks a random number
SetSecretValue(mpk, ID) . The user with identity ID randomly selects t ∈ Z q , and sets S ID = t.
SetPublicKey(mpk, D ID , S ID )
. Given the user's secret value S ID , and ID-Based Key D ID , the user computes U ID = g SID , and sets pk ID = (U ID , R ID , δ ID ).
SetPrivateKey(mpk, D ID , S ID )
. Given the user's public key mpk, secret value S ID and ID-Based Key D ID , the user sets sk ID = (D ID , S ID ).
Key Exchange . To establish a session key, party A and party B exchange the following messages.
where e A ∈ Z q , e B ∈ Z q are randomly selected by A and B respectively.
The computation of the session key between A and B is as follows:
Party A: compute
and output the session key as
Party B: compute
where sid = ID A , ID B , pk A , E A , pk B , E B .
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF YANG AND TAN'S PROTOCOL
Yang and Tan [20] claimed that their protocol was provably secure in the random oracle model, including the forward secrecy. That is, if an attacker does not know all of (D A , S A , esk A ), or all of (D B , S B , esk B ), it is unable for the attacker to derive the session key. However, in this section, we disprove their result by giving concrete attacks, and propose an improved scheme to prevent these attacks.
A. Attack
For this protocol, to derive a session key, an adversary can first make two RevealExtractIDBasedKey queries to learn z A and z B , then make a RevealSecretValue(B) query to learn S B and make a RevealEphemeralKey(A, i) query to learn e A . Obviously, the adversary learns neither the value of S A and e B , which satisfies that an attacker does not know all of (D A , S A , esk A ), or all of (D B , S B , esk B ) . However, the adversary can also compute the session key. To attack this protocol, the adversary might perform the following steps
Step 1 the adversary can compute as follows
Step 2 As the adversary can not make a RevealSecretValue(A) query, he can not obtain the value of S A , thus should not compute the Z 2 , Z 5 and Z 7 .
However, as to party B, the adversary does not obtain the value of e B , but learns S B and z B , and can compute
It is easy to see that adversary can really derive the session key as
The adversary can successfully calculate the session key associated with the calculation between part A and party B, which is completely independent and symmetrical.
B. Our improved scheme
From the analysis in the previous section, we can see that the insecurity of Yang and Tan's protocol is due to the independent of the ephemeral key e A , e B and the ID-based key z A , z B , the e A , e B and z A , z B are not fully intertwined enough. In the following, we do a slight modification on Yang and Tan's protocol, and show a new CL-KE protocol without pairing which can resist the attack mentioned above. Our improvement is as follows.
Setup, ExtractIdBasedKey, SetSecretValue, SetPublicKey and SetPrivateKey are the same as those in Section 3.
Key Exchange
To establish a session key, party A and party B exchange the following messages.
SA+eA . and output the session key as
SB +eB . and output the session key as
The process of the key exchange is as figure 1. In this section, we will analyze the security of the improved protocol, and show that it can work correctly. Since our protocol is derived from Yang and Tan's protocol but made appropriate modification, it can achieve forward secrecy. Through analysis of the protocol, we show that the protocol can withstand some known attacks, for example, public key replacement attack.
1) known-key secrecy
Even if the session key is compromised, the adversary does not compromise past or future sessions, as short-term keys are used in generating session keys. Even the two participants of the protocol remain the same, it also generate different session keys.
2) Forward secrecy Even if the long-term private key is compromised, the adversary does not reveal previously established session keys. Even the adversary obtain the value of e A and S B , he can calculate neither of z 8 and z 9 , that is, he can not compute the session key, so this protocol can achieve the perfect forward secrecy.
3) PKG forward secrecy The big advantage of the CL-PKC is no-escrow. Even the PKG's master private key is compromised, the adversary (including the PKG) can not reveal previously established session keys. The adversary may generate partial private key, however, in order to compute the established key, the adversary should also obtain both the value of a short-term private key and the full (long-term) private key.
4) unknown key-share resilience
The aim of this attack is to make one participant believe a key which is shared with another participant, and force the two participants to share the same secret. However, the two participants can never share the same key, for they should use the identifier of the intended peer when they compute the session key.
5) key-compromise impersonation
Key-compromise impersonation does not to our proposed protocol. Arming with the private key of A, an adversary can impersonate B to A, however, he can not compute the value of z 7 without knowing the private key of B.
6) known session-specific information security If the short-term private key is compromised, it also does not reveal the established key. Specifically, even an adversary obtains the values of z A and z B in any session between A and B, he can not compute z 7 , z 8 .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, by giving a concrete attack, we have indicated that Yang and Tan's CL-KE protocol without pairing is not secure under their security model. We have also presented an improvement to prevent the attack and given some further security discussions.
